In his extraordinary work, Animals I Rights, first p.ililished in 1892, Henry Salt, although giving much credit to humanitarian feeling in antiquity and the Renaissance, situated the first true develofXOOIlt of the concept of animal rights in the Enlighten ment.
"It was not until the eighteenth cen tury, the age of enlightenment and 'sensibi lity' of which Voltaire and Rousseau were the spokesmen, " he wrote, "that the rights of animals obtained ITDre deliberate recognition" (p. 4).
Indeed, in our contemporary under standing of the word, all of its variants and offshoots (the rights of man, of the citizen, of WOllen, slaves, prisoners, gays--and of animals, too) stem fran that period when the European bourgeoisie, and by extension the American as well, formulated a revolutionary ideology that, in the language of the time, called for liberation fran tyranny, des potism, and oppression and vindicated libera tive action by the elaboration of a network of "rights"--aITDng them life, liberty, and the prrsuit of happiness, as well as sane that we might consider ITDre esoteric, like the right to own property, but which Voltaire likened to the cry of nature.
Neither Rousseau nor Voltaire can prob ably be considered a major contributor to the develofXOOIlt of the concept of animal rights, but Salt's words are no less true for that. More direct attacks on human mistreatment of animals in the name of their innate (if not Gcd-given) rights and on the ITDdel of the ongoing struggle for human rights (not just those of the male, white bourgeoisie but of WOllen, slaves, proletarians, and colonial peoples) found their source in the writings of the Enlightenment PrilosoIilers, aITDng them, Rousseau and Voltaire, who both ad dressed themselves to the question of the relation between rnen and beasts. tification or even of kinship.
Sadly, per haps, we must admit the i.rmlense resistance human beings present to recognizing obliga tions even to individuals of their own race and species without a prior denonstration of sane sort of kinship. "Blood is thicker than water. "
The author of the medieval Chanson de Roland expressed this parochial conviction with admirable succinctness; "Christians are right (unt droit); pagans are wrong."
The old British device invokes "Dieu et ITDn droit" (Gcd and my right), not the rights of others.
Rousseau and Voltaire inherited fran their recent past as a target for criticism an analysis of man's radical difference fran other living creatures that was riddled with contradictions but had acquired status be cause of the unquestionable brilliance of its author, the great Rene Descartes.
in an effort doubtless directed both toward coun tering accusations of heresy and justifying the use of animals in experimentation ("ab solving men fran the suspicion of crime," in his words) , Descartes argued that animals were natural automata, incapable of thought and feeling and ITDved by divinely created mechanisms analogous to the ingenious spring operated clockwork devices that human beings had used to give a semblance of life to their own inanimate creations.
(If one leaves Gcd out of the equation, Descartes' explanation of animal behavior is not very far fran the one that present-day behavioristic socio biologists offer for the conduct of human beings, whose every gesture is dictated by an inherited genetic code and who can find vir tue or vice in pills or liquid potions, much like their literary ITDdel, Stevenson's Dr.
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Why God endowed these insentient lOOchanical creatures with a canplete set of sensory organs remarkably similar to those of human beings, Descartes failed to explain, although he clearly was aware of this anbar rassing impediment to the plausibility of his arguwent and admitted that the presence of those organs might lead less subtle minds than his to the false conclusion that animals were capable of sensation.
With this over-easy dismissal of a grave IOOral problem that had troubled others for centuries, Descartes affirms a sanewhat fa cile seal to the position that there is a radical and absolute difference, an un bridgeable gulf separating humanity fran all other creatures on earth (theologians were willing to speculate on our possible kinship with demons and angels, distant cousins in heaven or hell, related to us by their intel lect) • One of the problems Descartes' posi tion created for him was that it was irrecon cilable with a belief in evolution, and there seem to be sane hints that he thought the evolutionary process not inconceivable. A century later, the naturalist Buffon would adopt a similarly contradictory stance, ad hering to orthodox Christian belief in the idea of separate creation for humankind, but also clearly aware of the many functional and structural resemblances between us and other animals. Obviously, acceptance of the impli cations of zoological observation required either exceptional courage or the advent of an era in which Christian dogma would be put on the defensiv8.
Needless to say, Voltaire and Rousseau not only lived in such an era, as Buffon did, too, but possessed extraordi nary courage.
Discreet as Voltaire could be and timid as Rousseau surely was in many situations, they jeopardized their freedan and even their lives with much of what they wrote.
It would be extravagant, however, to see either of these two as putting his neck on the block for animals' rights, or even as considering this a central issue.
Neither one--and this is not to their discreditwent so far in his repudiation of the Car tesian characterization of aniJreJ.s as Darwin would in the next century, IOOSt explicitly in The Descent of Man.
Darwin's writing--and this was for many of his contemp::>raries, as it still is today for "Creationists," the IOOst horrifying aspect of it---tended toward a recognition of a literal blood relationship or consanguinity, our true family relation ship with those species that even he con tinued to call the "lower orders." Born with what Darwin called "a pedigree of prodigious length," man owes that birth to a long line of non-human progenitors.
"Unless we will fully close our eyes," Darwin concluded in his chapter on the genealogy of man, "we may, with our present knowledge, approximately recognize our parentage." "Nor," he added, "need we feel ashamed of it" (The Descent of Man, chapter VI).
Darwin was not the first to reject the belief that man is the work of a separate act of creation, although his wri tings went farther to establish the certainty of our tilysical relatedness to other animals than any had before. But if we distinguish the "scientific" deIOOnstration of a literal family-tree sort of kinship fran the senti ment of sharing in a cemoon nature, involving both tilysical and spiritual relatedness, then Voltaire and Rousseau are readily identifi able aIOOng Darwin's predecesors--more than Descartes and Buffon, who, ironically, are sozretimes perceived as in the lineage of the evolutionist tililosotilers. *** ' The best text to cite fran Voltaire is surely the short piece entitled "Betes" (beasts) in the original 1764 edition of the Dictionnaire prilosophique, included by Tern Regan and Peter Singer in Animal , under the title of 'A Reply to Descartes." It is un mistakably a refutation of Descartes' posi tion, although he is not named in the ar ticle.
Voltaire does not mince words, haw ever.
He denounces the poverty of spirit of those who claim that animals are machines deprived of awareness and feeling (connias et sentiment).
Descartes had argued that articulate speech constitutes the only evidence of capacity for feeling or for memo ry or ideas.
Voltaire, in seeking to demon strate the vacuity of this arguwent (really no IOOre than an assertion) describes in de tail the compelling evidence of a dog's feelings of grief, pain, and joy in the form of what present-day linguists might call "non-~tic" behavior. In refreshingly unin hibited language, he does not hesitate to describe as "barbarisms" the vivisectionists as he pictures them seiZing the dog "who surpasses man so prodigiously in friendship," nailing him to a table, and cutting him up alive.
"Answer loo, lOOchanic (machiniste),
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'The best text to cite fran Voltaire is surely the short piece entitled "Betes" (beasts) in the original 1764 edition of the Dictionnaire prilosophique, included by Tern Regan and Peter Singer in Animal Rights and Human Obligations (pp. 67-69), under the title of 'A Reply to Descartes." It is unmistakably a refutation of Descartes' position, although he is not named in the article.
Voltaire does not mince words, hawever.
He denounces the poverty of spirit of those who claim that animals are machines deprived of awareness and feeling (conniaset sentiment).
Descartes had argued that articulate speech constitutes the only evidence of capacity for feeling or for memory or ideas.
Voltaire, in seeking to demonstrate the vacuity of this arguwent (really no IOOre than an assertion) describes in detail the compelling evidence of a dog's feelings of grief, pain, and joy in the form of what present-day linguists might call "non-~tic" behavior. In refreshingly uninhibited language, he does not hesitate to describe as "barbarisms" the vivisectionists as he pictures them seiZing the dog "who surpasses man so prodigiously in friendship," nailing him to a table, and cutting him up alive.
"Answer loo, lOOchanic (machiniste), has nature arranged all the springs of feel ing in this animal so that it should not feel?" (It is significant and, of course, characteristic that, while Descartes des cribed the body as a machine made by the hands of God, Voltaire identifies the archi teet of creation as Nature herself, thus distancing himself from orthodox Christian theism. )
Voltaire' s language is direct, clear , unambiguous, and forceful. He appeals to the reader's cx:xrrron sense and to his personal observations and experience of life.
He addressed the unnamed Descartes and those who think as he does directly with the familiar tu, abolishing distance and formality and creating, as it were, the illusion of dia logue and, with it, life and IlIOvement. Last ly, he does not dissociate theory and prac tice, as a IlIOre timid writer might. The cartesian to whom he appeals is not an idle armchair theorist, whose intellectual con structions are divorced from concrete reali ty, from the active, lived experience. No! He himself is p..1tting the ideas into prac tice, which, indeed, is inseparable from the theory that has been concocted to legitimize it. This practice is being irnp::Jsed, brutally and inhumanely, upon the animal Voltaire represents as being like ourselves.
In him, he declares, "there are the same organs of feeling as there are in thyself (dans toi)." The contradiction in the cartesian's theory, which would be harmless and without conse quence if it could be contained at that le vel, has nCM becane, in the cartesian's ac tion, a IlIOnstrous contradiction of his own humanity.
Moreover, by asserting the dog's derronstration of friendship and love, a high level of social relationship that the anthro pocentric cartesian would reserve for human beings alone, Voltaire demolishes the carte sian's claim of IlIOral superiority and estab lishes the contrary, the animal's superiori ty, not in the mJde of an allegorical fable, but as literal fact, made apparent by this confrontation of the dog's loving behavior and the cartesian's insensitive brutality.
There are in this brief article of Vol taire's sane further words on the question of the souls of animals.
Are they substantial forms, as Aristotle and Christian theologians maintained?
Or are their souls material? These pages may interest us less as a ccmnen tary on Voltaire's conception of our relation to animals and our obligations toward them. They are, however, revelatory of his impa tience with what he considered futile rreta physical questions and the kind. of vaporous mentality he associated with them.
He also uses the question to reassert the attribution of feeling, nerory, and thought (limited, perhaps, to "a certain number of ideas") by the same supreme being who makes grass grow and subjected the earth to the sun's gravita tional force, thus reminding his readers of his preference for Newton above Aristotle and Descartes, as a true ideologist of the En lightenment.
This part of VOltaire's article is also related in its thrust to other texts that he p..1t together on the subject of the soul, which he always took great pleasure in demys tifying.
In one of them, which appeared a few years later (in Questions sur l' Encyclo , 1770), he repeated elements of the article we have been discussing, but with the difference that Descartes is named and that what he calls "the strange system which sup poses animals to be p..1re machines without any sensation" is identified as Descartes' "chi mera. "
(See "De l' Arne des Betes" ["en Ani rnals' Souls") in Dictionnaire philosophique, Notes, pp. 428-9.) As usual, ridicule and irony are his weapons as he IlIOCks Descartes' unprecedented "abuse of the gift of rea soning" with his curious assumption that nature gave animals all of our organs of feeling in order that they might be totally deprived of feeling! D:>ubtless, this was not quite the way Descartes had p..1t it, but the lurid clarity of Voltaire's way of spelling out the grotesque implication of the carte sian argument effectively causes it to dis solve in absurdity, as his reader dissolves in laughter, a technique that Voltaire raised to the level of high art in candide and many other pieces of philosophical fiction.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau was as much a man of the Enlightenment as Voltaire, although that. can be obscured by the fact that they came to detest each other and by Rousseau's progressive isolation from the other main stream philosophes.
When Rousseau writes of animals, it is in a very different voice from Voltaire's, but it is all the IlIOre striking that so much of their approach to the ques tion should be based on the same tmderlying concerns.
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Jean-Jacques Rousseau was as much a man of the Enlightenment as Voltaire, although that. can be obscured by the fact that they came to detest each other and by Rousseau's progressive isolation from the other mainstream philosophes.
When Rousseau writes of animals, it is in a very different voice from Voltaire's, but it is all the IlIOre striking that so much of their approach to the question should be based on the same tmderlying concerns.
Most important, perhaps, is that, like Voltaire, Rousseau attached great importance to our fellow animals' capacity for feeling and through this to their kinship with us.
Banal as it is to say, ooe cannot over state the importance Rousseau attached to sentiment. For him (as for other "pre-ranan tics" of the eighteenth century) the capacity for feeling deeply was a fatal gift, a guar anty of pain, but also of !lOral value. ('!bat gift, rather than learning or physical beau ty, was what attracted the heroine of Rous seau's novel, The New Heloise, to her young tutor. ) in the Emile, Rousseau's chronicle of a child's developnent into adulthood, he cooducts the boy into adolescence, the pas sion and !lOral awakening of which are asso ciated roore than anything else with the reve latioos of deep feeling.
The child Emile had, of course, felt pleasure and pain, but, like other children, had remained indifferent to what was outside of himself. It is in the birth of pity, experienced through the cries and convulsions of a dying animal that the child bece::Kres a man. This is what Rousseau calls his first "relative" feeling:
To beccrne sensitive and capable of pity, the child must know that there are beings like himself who suffer what he has suffered. In fact, how are we to allow our selves to be rooved by pity tmless it is by escaping fran ourselves and identifying ourselves with the suffering animal by taking leave, so to speak, of our own being in order to assume his? (Emile, Book IV, p. 261.) It is surely significant that Rousseau chose the spectacle of the death throes of an animal as the event to awaken in his young pupil a sense of kinship with others than himself so that the erootion of pity may be born.
He recognized that not all human beings are rooved deeply by the suffering of animals and speculated on why it is that we can be roore hardened to their pain than to that of other human beings, despite the fact that the sensitivity that we share in cammon ought to identify us equally with them. One cause, he believed, is the supposition that animals are less endowed with either rnemJry (of past suffering) or imagination (of the future) than we are. And, thus, the animal's suffering is judged roore limited than the presumably roore canplex person's.
Rousseau uses this distinctioo that people are accuste:.tred to draw between them selves and animals to develop an analogy with distinctions people make aroong themselves: "By extension we beccrne hardened in the same way toward the lot of sane men, and the rich console themselves for the harm they do to the poor by supposing that they are stupid enough not to feel it" (pp. 264-5). In this way, Rousseau alroost slyly insinuates an accusation of soc:ial injustice with the cas uistic justificatioo by the rich of their wrongdoing into his argument about animals, thus putting human apologetics for their mistreatment in the same perspective and also inviting redress for animals as a parallel to the struggle for human rights on the part of the impoverished mass of people.
Rousseau's developnent of this analogy strikes at assumptions that have been made throughout history.
Aristotle, for example, cast doubts upon the humanity of slaves. in the enlightened nineteenth century, it was cammonly assumed that working class men and wanen lacked the sensitivity of the roonied classes and suffered less fran hunger, cold, and other deprivations. Nietzsche, in a curious passage of his On the Genealogy of Morals, declared his solemn conviction that Blacks ("taken as representatives of prehis toric man") can endure pain "that would drive even the best constituted European to dis traction."
In a truly extraordinary sen tence, even for Nietzsche, he elaborated on 7 tance to our fellow animals' capacity for feeling and through this to their kinship with us.
Banal as it is to say, ooe cannot overstate the importance Rousseau attached to sentiment. For him (as for other "pre-ranantics" of the eighteenth century) the capacity for feeling deeply was a fatal gift, a guaranty of pain, but also of !lOral value. ('!bat gift, rather than learning or physical beauty, was what attracted the heroine of Rousseau's novel, The New Heloise, to her young tutor. ) in the Emile, Rousseau's chronicle of a child's developnent into adulthood, he cooducts the boy into adolescence, the passion and !lOral awakening of which are associated roore than anything else with the revelatioos of deep feeling.
To beccrne sensitive and capable of pity, the child must know that there are beings like himself who suffer what he has suffered. In fact, how are we to allow ourselves to be rooved by pity tmless it is by escaping fran ourselves and identifying ourselves with the suffering animal by taking leave, so to speak, of our own being in order to assume his? (Emile, Book IV, p. 261.) It is surely significant that Rousseau chose the spectacle of the death throes of an animal as the event to awaken in his young pupil a sense of kinship with others than himself so that the erootion of pity may be born.
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Rousseau uses this distinctioo that people are accuste:.tred to draw between themselves and animals to develop an analogy with distinctions people make aroong themselves: "By extension we beccrne hardened in the same way toward the lot of sane men, and the rich console themselves for the harm they do to the poor by supposing that they are stupid enough not to feel it" (pp. 264-5). In this way, Rousseau alroost slyly insinuates an accusation of soc:ial injustice with the casuistic justificatioo by the rich of their wrongdoing into his argument about animals, thus putting human apologetics for their mistreatment in the same perspective and also inviting redress for animals as a parallel to the struggle for human rights on the part of the impoverished mass of people.
Aristotle, for example, cast doubts upon the humanity of slaves. in the enlightened nineteenth century, it was cammonly assumed that working class men and wanen lacked the sensitivity of the roonied classes and suffered less fran hunger, cold, and other deprivations. Nietzsche, in a curious passage of his On the Genealogy of Morals, declared his solemn conviction that Blacks ("taken as representatives of prehistoric man") can endure pain "that would drive even the best constituted European to distraction."
In a truly extraordinary sentence, even for Nietzsche, he elaborated on this by no means uncamon idea that both animals and the lower orders of the hunan species are relatively insensitive to pain: 'Ibe curve of hunan susceptibility to pain seems in fact to take an extraordinary and abrost sudden drop as soon as one has passed the upper ten thousand or ten million of the top stratum of culture; and for my own part, I have no doubt that the canbined suffering of all the animals ever subjected to the knife for scientific ends is utter ly negligible compared with one painful night of a single hysteri cal bluestocking. (On the Genealo gy of Morals, SecondEssay , Section VII. ) rbrds like these denonstrate the sadly ines capable fact that the brilliant Nietzsche, capable of truly radical thought, was as much a prey to ignorant superstition as the roost benighted of his contemp::rraries.
We may, of course, agree that people whose bodies have been softened by inactivity and canfort may feel the sudden imposition of pain roore a cutely than those who have had to accustor. themselves to hardship. But Rousseau's per ception of the canbination of bad faith and prejudice in the rich person's lulling of his conscience and of the analogous way in which men make little of animals' suffering seems far roore penetrating than Nietzsche's wild thrashing, in which he takes on not only animals but also African Blacks, intellectual wanen, and all the impoverished masses unfor tunate enough to be born below the top "stra tum" of European society.
'Ibe argument in Rousseau's Emile is readily relatable to passages in other wri tings of his in which, for reasons both per sonal and philosophical, he attacks the ine qualities that have developed in hunan socie ty.
Probably the roost significant of these is the second discourse of 1754 on the ori gins of inequality annng men. In the preface to that work, attentive as always to the importance of the pre-rational, he had iden tified two "principles:" an ardent preoccu pation with our own well-being and self preservation and "a natural rep.lgnaIlce to see any sensitive being and principally those of our own kind (~ semblables) perish or suf fer" (Ganlier-Flanmarion edition, p. 153 ). An inner i..rnp.l1se of ccmni.seration (assimil able to the pity born in the fourth book of the Emile) will agitate on behalf of our never harming another man "or even any sensi tive being (aucun etre sensible)." For Rousseau, this settles the ancient disp..1tes on participation by animals in natu ral law:
For it is clear that, deprived of intellect and of freedan, they cannot recognize [natural law]; but, since they share sarething of r;:nrr nature through the sensitivity with which-they are endowed, one will judge that they too ought to participate in natural right and that man is subject to sore sort of duties toward them.
It seems, in fact, that, if I am obliged to do no harm to my fellow man [roon sem blable], it is less because he is a reasonable being than because he is a sensitive being; a quality that, being camon to beast and man, ought at least to give the one the right not to be uselessly mis treated by the other (Ibid.).
We must, of course, recognize that, despite his heretical deviations fran both catholic and calvinist dogma of his time, Rousseau was less estranged fran theological conceptions than Voltaire and was, therefore, roore disposed to deny animals both reason and freedan.
Nevertheless, there are at least two radical elements in this statement of his. One is that animals have rights. More over, the right Rousseau enunciates (not to be mistreated by men) is conceived on the roodel of eighteenth century hunan rights in the sense that it is a defensive right, a right that limits the freedan of the oppres sor to have his way with the victim. More than an "enabling~ right for the individual for whan the right is proclaimed, it is a "privative" curbing of previously uninhibited powers of authority.
'Ibe fact that Rousseau sees things this way is in itself a great leap forward, even though he is willing to limit the forbidden mistreatment to what is "useless."
'Ibe second radical element of Rousseau's argument is his displacement of intelligence or rationality as a qualification for animal rights or hunan obligations toward them. Jeremy Bentham will write just a few decades later in words that sound like a crisp, con densed echo of Rousseau's:
"The ~estion is
Bm.WEEN 'mE SPEX::IES 8 this by no means uncamon idea animals and the lower orders of species are relatively insensitive that both the hunan to pain:
the Emile) will agitate on behalf of our never harming another man "or even any sensitive being (aucun etre sensible)."
'Ibe curve of hunan susceptibility to pain seems in fact to take an extraordinary and abrost sudden drop as soon as one has passed the upper ten thousand or ten million of the top stratum of culture; and for my own part, I have no doubt that the canbined suffering of all the animals ever subjected to the knife for scientific ends is utterly negligible compared with one painful night of a single hysterical bluestocking. (On the Genealogy of Morals, SecondEssay , Section VII. ) rbrds like these denonstrate the sadly inescapable fact that the brilliant Nietzsche, capable of truly radical thought, was as much a prey to ignorant superstition as the roost benighted of his contemp::rraries.
We may, of course, agree that people whose bodies have been softened by inactivity and canfort may feel the sudden imposition of pain roore acutely than those who have had to accustor. themselves to hardship. But Rousseau's perception of the canbination of bad faith and prejudice in the rich person's lulling of his conscience and of the analogous way in which men make little of animals' suffering seems far roore penetrating than Nietzsche's wild thrashing, in which he takes on not only animals but also African Blacks, intellectual wanen, and all the impoverished masses unfortunate enough to be born below the top "stratum" of European society.
'Ibe argument in Rousseau's Emile is readily relatable to passages in other writings of his in which, for reasons both personal and philosophical, he attacks the inequalities that have developed in hunan society.
Probably the roost significant of these is the second discourse of 1754 on the origins of inequality annng men. In the preface to that work, attentive as always to the importance of the pre-rational, he had identified two "principles:" an ardent preoccupation with our own well-being and selfpreservation and "a natural rep.lgnaIlce to see any sensitive being and principally those of our own kind (~semblables) perish or suffer" (Ganlier-Flanmarion edition, p. 153 ). An inner i..rnp.l1se of ccmni.seration (assimilable to the pity born in the fourth book of Bm.WEEN 'mE SPEX::IES 8 For Rousseau, this settles the ancient disp..1tes on participation by animals in natural law:
It seems, in fact, that, if I am obliged to do no harm to my fellow man [roon semblable], it is less because he is a reasonable being than because he is a sensitive being; a quality that, being camon to beast and man, ought at least to give the one the right not to be uselessly mistreated by the other (Ibid.).
Nevertheless, there are at least two radical elements in this statement of his. One is that animals have rights. Moreover, the right Rousseau enunciates (not to be mistreated by men) is conceived on the roodel of eighteenth century hunan rights in the sense that it is a defensive right, a right that limits the freedan of the oppressor to have his way with the victim. More than an "enabling~right for the individual for whan the right is proclaimed, it is a "privative" curbing of previously uninhibited powers of authority.
'Ibe second radical element of Rousseau's argument is his displacement of intelligence or rationality as a qualification for animal rights or hunan obligations toward them. Jeremy Bentham will write just a few decades later in words that sound like a crisp, condensed echo of Rousseau's:
"The~estion is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk [as Descartes had held]? but, Can they suffer?" (Fran '!be Principles of M:lrals and Legisla tion, 1789, quoted by Regan and Singer, ~. cit., p. 130.)
As a matter of fact, declarations of rights for human beings have not claimed them only for conspicuously rational members of the species.
'!be 1\merican Declaration of Independence declared all rren equal and claimed rights for them all (even conceivably including by implication future liberation for wanen and slaves).
One after the other, exploited and oppressed groups have asserted and struggled for rights, winning them to sane extent, no doubt, through the exercise of tactical intelligence, but without relying on a stipulation of intellect as a require rrent for a<XIUisition of the rights in ques tion.
On the other hand, the denial of rights has frequently been justified (even very recently by amateur geneticists in the United States, for example) by a claim of intellectual inferiority.
For Rousseau, this displacement is all the rrore significant because of his acknow ledgement of man's intellectual superiority. He believed that for animals instinct is the rrotive force behind choice and action--per haps, a bit as sane biologists today believe it is the encoded message on a genetic "tape" that has replaced the stars in arbitrating human destiny---whereas man decides (in alrrost Sartrean terms) through an act of freedan. As often, the distinctions are scrrewhat mur ky.
Rousseau seens to follow Descartes when he sees in the animal "an ingenious machine;" but then he also speaks of the "human ma chine, " and the contrast is no longer abso lute.
'!be animal lacks intellect (lumi.ere), but it is capable of conceiving "ideas," "because it has senses," and it is also capa ble of canbining ideas. Proof, if we did not have enough of it fran other sources, that Rousseau had read John Locke.
But, here he is applying Locke's notions on human under standing to mindless animals 1
One might see in these apparently con tradictory positions a sign of the awkward dilarma Rousseau and other philosoPlers con front when they have inherited rroral reserva tions about admitting their close kinship with animals and yet are prevented by their own honesty fran denying totally what obser vation has taught them.
Rousseau seems to arrive at an amalgam of concepts in which he cannot refrain fran fo=lating differences that he has been led to believe IlU.lSt be essential but stops short of permitting the conception of those differences to legitimize inflicting pain on animals, and, on the other hand, he clings to a perception of our kin ship with animals as sensitive beings and to our CXJIl1lOfl right to have rights in self defense against oppression.
The line of perceived kinship leads Rousseau to deferrling the practice of vege tarianism (Origins of Inequality, p. 163). He finds that the structure of human teeth and intestines puts us arrong the fruit-eaters (les frugivores).
This, he suggests, is evidence that, in the state of nature fran which man has fallen, he lived (contrary to Hobbes' grinmer view) in peace with his fel low creatures.
It is the flesh-eating ani mals that engage in canbat for their prey, whereas vegetarians co-exist in perpetual peace, as humankind might have if we had remllned fruit-eaters and never left the idyllic state of nature.
Thus does Rousseau integrate the myth of a lost paradise where we were innocent and happy with a serious critique of the Plysical exploitation of animals. In abandoning the bloodless diet of fruits and vegetables, man symbolically for sook peaceful relations with his fellow crea tures on earth, cast the die for survival through killing, and thus added violence tcMard other animals to the other manifesta tions of rroral degredation that Rousseau associated with the historical evolution of human society.
***
Although neither Rousseau nor Voltaire may have achieved in its totality that "deli berate recognition" of animals' rights that Henry Salt situated in the age of enlighten ment and sensibility, their part in preparing a climate favorable to it is at least as important as Salt believed it was.
Both of them rejected the absolute conderrnation of animals to treatment as objects of insentient matter.
Both, in their different styles, argued for our acceptance of animals as fel low creatures, capable of thought and, above all, of feeling.
Both wrote in an era that voiced its horror of violence, of war, of persecution, and of ignorant superstition and intolerance.
Like As a matter of fact, declarations of rights for human beings have not claimed them only for conspicuously rational members of the species.
One after the other, exploited and oppressed groups have asserted and struggled for rights, winning them to sane extent, no doubt, through the exercise of tactical intelligence, but without relying on a stipulation of intellect as a requirerrent for a<XIUisition of the rights in question.
For Rousseau, this displacement is all the rrore significant because of his acknowledgement of man's intellectual superiority. He believed that for animals instinct is the rrotive force behind choice and action--perhaps, a bit as sane biologists today believe it is the encoded message on a genetic "tape" that has replaced the stars in arbitrating human destiny---whereas man decides (in alrrost Sartrean terms) through an act of freedan. As often, the distinctions are scrrewhat murky.
Rousseau seens to follow Descartes when he sees in the animal "an ingenious machine;" but then he also speaks of the "human machine, " and the contrast is no longer absolute.
'!be animal lacks intellect (lumi.ere), but it is capable of conceiving "ideas," "because it has senses," and it is also capable of canbining ideas. Proof, if we did not have enough of it fran other sources, that Rousseau had read John Locke.
But, here he is applying Locke's notions on human understanding to mindless animals 1
One might see in these apparently contradictory positions a sign of the awkward dilarma Rousseau and other philosoPlers confront when they have inherited rroral reservations about admitting their close kinship with animals and yet are prevented by their own honesty fran denying totally what observation has taught them.
Rousseau seems to arrive at an amalgam of concepts in which he 9 cannot refrain fran fo=lating differences that he has been led to believe IlU.lSt be essential but stops short of permitting the conception of those differences to legitimize inflicting pain on animals, and, on the other hand, he clings to a perception of our kinship with animals as sensitive beings and to our CXJIl1lOfl right to have rights in selfdefense against oppression.
The line of perceived kinship leads Rousseau to deferrling the practice of vegetarianism (Origins of Inequality, p. 163). He finds that the structure of human teeth and intestines puts us arrong the fruit-eaters (les frugivores).
This, he suggests, is evidence that, in the state of nature fran which man has fallen, he lived (contrary to Hobbes' grinmer view) in peace with his fellow creatures.
It is the flesh-eating animals that engage in canbat for their prey, whereas vegetarians co-exist in perpetual peace, as humankind might have if we had remllned fruit-eaters and never left the idyllic state of nature.
Thus does Rousseau integrate the myth of a lost paradise where we were innocent and happy with a serious critique of the Plysical exploitation of animals. In abandoning the bloodless diet of fruits and vegetables, man symbolically forsook peaceful relations with his fellow creatures on earth, cast the die for survival through killing, and thus added violence tcMard other animals to the other manifestations of rroral degredation that Rousseau associated with the historical evolution of human society.
Although neither Rousseau nor Voltaire may have achieved in its totality that "deliberate recognition" of animals' rights that Henry Salt situated in the age of enlightenment and sensibility, their part in preparing a climate favorable to it is at least as important as Salt believed it was.
Both, in their different styles, argued for our acceptance of animals as fellow creatures, capable of thought and, above all, of feeling.
Like Kant, both would have continued on page 24 troying the happiness of others. Thus, R2 is continued from page 9 at odds with both of our primary IlX)ral conan end in itself, although when Kant, alas, cerns, justice and happiness. Consequently, approved an neither premise of the pro-researcher arguethic forbidding utilization of a sentient creature as an object rather than as ment is morally justified.
declared that ''man can have no duty to any beings except hwnan," what we knCM of both
Conclusion
Voltaire and Rousseau suggests very strongly that at that point they would have parted <Xmpany with this all too hwnanistic philosoprohibit all research with animals, is un-];i1er and, like Schopenhauer, have found that proposition "revolting and abaninable."
The pro-aniJnal argument, which would sound, but so is the pro-researcher argument, which would pennit any experiment on animals which might benefit humms. The reasons against these arguments suggest the following positive conclusions: EDITIOOS Q)NSULTED (i ) Fundarnentally, there should be just one set of moral principles concerning research, rather than one set for experiments Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of on hwnans and another, weaker set for experiMorals (New York: Vintage Books, 1969 -Hall, 1976) . clear and present opportunity for making the world a happier place and ImlSt be roade acJean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile (1762) (Pacording to principles which insure that the ris: Garnier, 1957) . sacrifices are borne fairly by all those likely to benefit fran the experiment. Discours sur l'origine de l'inegalite (Paris:
GarnierIf these principles were adopted and Flammarion, 1971). enforced, the abuses of animals which concern proponents of the pro-animal argument could Henry S. Salt, An.i.mals' Rights (Clarks be eliminated without canpranising the prosSurrrnit: Society for Animal Rights, 1980). pect of continued advances in knowledge which concern proponents of the pro-researcher Voltaire, Dictionnaire philosophique argument.
(Paris: Garnier, 1954).
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Orders for subscriptions or single copies should be sent accompanied by a check to Schweitzer Center San Francisco Bay Institute PO 254, Berkeley, CA 94701, USA BEIWEEN THE SPFX::IES 24 troying the happiness of others. Thus, R2 is at odds with both of our primary IlX)ral concerns, justice and happiness. Consequently, neither premise of the pro-researcher argument is morally justified.
Conclusion
The pro-aniJnal argument, which would prohibit all research with animals, is unsound, but so is the pro-researcher argument, which would pennit any experiment on animals which might benefit humms.
The reasons against these arguments suggest the following positive conclusions:
continued from page 9 an end in itself, although when Kant, alas, approved an ethic forbidding utilization of a sentient creature as an object rather than as declared that ''man can have no duty to any beings except hwnan," what we knCM of both Voltaire and Rousseau suggests very strongly that at that point they would have parted <Xmpany with this all too hwnanistic philoso-];i1er and, like Schopenhauer, have found that proposition "revolting and abaninable." EDITIOOS Q)NSULTED (i ) Fundarnentally, there should be just one set of moral principles concerning research, rather than one set for experiments on hwnans and another, weaker set for experiments on non-humms.
Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals (New York: Vintage Books, 1969) .
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile (1762) (Paris: Garnier, 1957 Garnierl'origine de l 'inegalite Flammarion, 1971) . If these principles were adopted and enforced, the abuses of animals which concern proponents of the pro-animal argument could be eliminated without canpranising the prospect of continued advances in knowledge which concern proponents of the pro-researcher argument.
(ii) Experimental sacrifices must be limited to situations in which there is a clear and present opportunity for making the world a happier place and ImlSt be roade according to principles which insure that the sacrifices are borne fairly by all those likely to benefit fran the experiment.
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